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is based on the best information available to the creditor, and is not
used for the purpose of circumventing or evading the disclosure requirements .
"..."23 As the Bissette court said, "[pilaintiffs do not
seek, nor does the Act require, full and complete disclosure of each
and every detail of the entire credit transaction.

24

All that is required

is a forthright indication of the cost of borrowing, allowing the consumer to decide for himself if the rate is reasonable and the best
available.

Criminal Law-

SEARCH

WARRANT

INCIDENT TO ARREST OF DEFENDANT
MISSIBLE IN

-

HEROIN

IN

His

SEIZED

IN

BACKYARD

APARTMENT HELD

AD-

EVIDENCE.-Fixel v. State, 256 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.

App. 1971), cert. denied, 262 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1972).
During a surveillance of defendant Robert Fixel's apartment and
backyard, an officer of the Key West police saw a number of personslater characterized by the appeal court as "known pushers"-enter
defendant's apartment. Another officer observed that several times
defendant went to a pile of debris in his backyard, removed something from a black zipper bag, and took it into his apartment. A
warrant to search the apartment was secured. One officer then went
to the front door and arrested Fixel while another picked up the bag
from the debris pile in the fenced-in backyard. The bag was found
to contain heroin. The police were unable to find any narcotics in the
apartment itself. The heroin seized in the backyard was admitted
at trial, and defendant was convicted of possession of heroin. On appeal,
the district court affirmed the conviction, stating that "Coolidge v.
New Hampshire .

.

. does not require a reversal in this case inasmuch

as that opinion recognizes that not every seizure of evidence which
is not supported by a warrant is unconstitutional."' The Florida
Supreme Court denied certiorari.2
The Fixel decision arguably misconstrues the import of Coolidge
v. New Hampshire.3 The law has long recognized that not all searches
and seizures need be authorized by a warrant. The significance of
Coolidge was not in its recognition of this principle but rather in
its discussion of the situations in which the warrant requirement
23.
24.
1.
2.
3.

Id.
340 F. Supp. at 1194.
256 So. 2d at 28.
262 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1972).
403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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would be excused. The central issue in Fixel was whether the warrantless seizure of the heroin qualified under any of the exceptions to
the warrant requirement; not whether such exceptions exist.
The court in Fixel was clearly of the opinion that the evidence
was admissible under some exception to the warrant requirement. It
is not immediately apparent, however, which exception was relied
upon. After observing that the police lawfully entered Fixel's apartment to make a warrantless arrest on probable cause, 4 the court
stated, as to the heroin seized in the backyard, that:'
[A] search was not necessary because the police observed the replacement of the heroin . . .. [H]eroin is contraband and is a
dangerous substance. It is important to note that we are not dealing
with an unlawful entry into a dwelling in order to procure evidence
of a crime but with an alleged trespass on to land in order to recover contraband. The seizure was, we think, incident to the lawful
arrest.
The final conclusion of the court appears to be that the heroin
was lawfully seized incident to a lawful arrest. Yet this would directly
conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in Chimel v. California,6
which limited searches incident to lawful arrest to "a search of the
arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. '- 7 Since Fixel
was arrested in his apartment, the seizure in the backyard was not
within the limited scope recognized by Chimel.8 Indeed, a seizure
of evidence located outside a dwelling could not have been sustained
as incident to an arrest inside the dwelling even under the much more
liberal scope of searches incident to arrest permitted prior to the
Chimel decision. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,9 for example, the
4. The court said that observation of a crime-that is, sale of heroin to known
pushers-constituted sufficient probable cause for the arrest. The trial record reveals
that there was no testimony that the visitors were known pushers. The officer conducting the surveillance testified, "I can't tell what was in his hand .... I couldn't
tell what it was or what it was for." Record, p. 46. It is at least questionable that this
evidence constituted probable cause for an arrest.
5. 256 So. 2d at 29 (footnote omitted).
6. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
7. Id. at 763.
8. Cf. Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238, 1259 (6th Cir. 1971) (Coolidge cited by
dissenting judge as authority for finding that search and seizure in a house cannot be
extended to another floor of the house); United States v. Taggart, 334 F. Supp. 206,
208 (D. Del. 1971) (Coolidge cited as authority that search incident to arrest must
be substantially contemporaneous and confined to immediate vicinity of the arrest).
9. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Since Chisnel, the case currently controlling the application
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Court struck down the warrantless seizure of an automobile parked
in the defendant's driveway, where the defendant was arrested in
his house.
The Fixel court may also have relied on the plain view exception
to the warrant requirement. The court stated that "a search was not
necessary because the police observed the replacement of the heroin."'1
Assuming the evidence was in fact plainly observable by the police, 1
it is questionable whether the discovery satisfied the restrictions placed
on plain view seizures by Coolidge.
Coolidge was suspected of the murder of a young girl. On information that his car might be connected with the crime, the state
attorney general (who later acted as investigator and prosecutor of
the case) issued a warrant authorizing a search of Coolidge's car.
Coolidge was then arrested, and the car was taken from his driveway
to the police station where it was searched two days after the arrest
and on two other occasions. Vacuum sweepings from the car, including
particles of gun powder, were introduced as evidence at the trial.
After denial of pretrial motions to suppress, the evidence was admitted at trial and Coolidge was convicted.

of this exception, was decided after the search in Coolidge and was considered prospective in its effect, the Court was forced to look to United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56 (1950), as authority. Rabinowitz, while not as restrictive as Chimel, still rendered
the exception inapplicable on the theory, according to the Coolidge Court, that a
warrantless search may extend only to an " 'area that is considered to be in the "possession" or under the "control" of the person arrested.'" 403 U.S. at 456, quoting from
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 760. The Court then stated that "a lawful pre-Chimel
arrest of a suspect outside his house could never by itself justify a warrantless search
inside the house. There is nothing in search-incident doctrine . . . that suggests a
different result where the arrest is made inside the house and the search outside and
at some distance away." Id. at 456-57 (footnote omitted).
10. 256 So. 2d at 29. The black zipper bag was probably not in plain view at the
time of seizure, since it was hidden in the pile of debris. However, it has been held
that an earlier observance of evidence in plain view will legitimate its seizure under
the plain view exception at a later time if its location is known. See United States v.
Wright, 449 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Welsch, 446 F.2d 220 (10th Cir.
1971). A more serious problem is that the heroin itself was never in plain view at any
time since it was inside the black bag. With reference to police seizures of evidence
without a warrant, the Supreme Court has said: "There must, of course, be a nexusautomatically provided in the case of fruits, instrumentalities or contraband-between
the item to be seized and criminal behavior. Thus in the case of 'mere evidence,'
probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought
will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction." Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
307 (1967).
11. The Florida Supreme Court has ruled that a police officer may assume any
position necessary to see evidence in open view as long as he has a legal right to be
where he is. Even looking through a crack in a garage door is seeing evidence in plain
view. But any slight intrusion, such as lifting a raincoat, constitutes a search and is
no longer a matter of plain view. See State v. Ashby, 245 So. 2d 225 (1971).
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The Supreme Court first determined that the warrant used in the
search and seizure was invalid because it had not been issued by an
impartial magistrate. 12 The Court then discussed whether the seizure
and search of the car was nevertheless permissible within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. The Court began its analysis by
accepting as "the most basic constitutional rule in this area"" the statement in Katz v. United States that " 'searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' "4 The rationale
for this rule is that any intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area, such as a residence,' 5 is an evil to be avoided. The warrant requirement minimizes the intrusive evils of police searches in two
ways: "First, the magistrate's scrutiny is intended to eliminate altogether searches not based on probable cause. . . . The second,
distinct objective is that those searches deemed necessary should be
as limited as possible. . . . The warrant accomplishes this second
objective by requiring a particular description of the things to be
seized."16
In plain view seizures, however, if the police are lawfully present
(because of a valid search warrant, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other reason) and inadvertently discover evidence which is "immediately apparent to the police"'17 as evidence
of crime, neither of the protective functions of the warrant requirement is relevant. The police are by definition lawfully present; a
magisterial determination of probable cause would be redundant.
Since the evidence is in plain view, the protective function of the
warrant served by a particular description of the things to be seized
is also inoperative; there is no exploratory search by definition.
Using this rationale, Justice Stewart, writing for four Justices,15
12. 403 U.S. at 453.
13. Id. at 454.
14. Id. at 454-55, quoting from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The
Court in Coolidge also expressed its opinion as to how these exceptions might be applied:
"The exceptions are 'jealously and carefully drawn,' and there must be 'a showing by
those who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation made that course
imperative." Id. at 455 quoting from 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (footnotes omitted).
15. Warrants are only required for constitutionally protected areas, which were
defined in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967): "For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even
in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
16. 403 U.S. at 467.
17. Id. at 466.
18. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall joined in the Stewart opinion. Justice
Harlan pointedly did not concur in Part-Il-C dealing with plain view, but did concur
in Part D which is a general defense of Parts II-B and 11-C, and in the judgment.

1973]

CASE COMMENTS

placed two important limitations on the plain view doctrine. First,
the initial intrusion by the police must have some lawful justification
other than plain view. "[P]lain view alone is never enough to
justify the warrantless seizure of evidence."' 19 Secondly, "the discovery
of evidence in plain view must be inadvertent."2 0 Since the state
planned in advance of Coolidge's arrest to seize his automobile, the
seizure was clearly not inadvertent. Hence, although the automobile
was parked in Coolidge's driveway and was obviously within the eyesight of the police when Coolidge was arrested, the seizure could not
be justified under the plain view exception. 2'
The first important determination in Fixel is whether the police
had a lawful justification for their initial intrusion other than plain
view of the evidence. The Court said in Coolidge that:22
Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an incriminating object
is on premises belonging to a criminal suspect may establish the
fullest possible measure of probable cause. But even where the object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly stated and enforced
the basic rule that the police may not enter and make a warrantless
seizure.
Applying this language to Fixel, it is clear that the police could not
rely on their observation of defendant's movements around the debris
pile to provide a basis for the warrantless seizure of the bag. Assuming
the observation constituted "incontrovertible testimony of the senses"
that heroin was in, or likely to be in, the bag, the police could rely
on no other exception to the general warrant requirement to justify
their intrusion. In other words, they would be relying on "plain view
alone" to justify the warrantless invasion and this was specifically prohibited by Coolidge.2 3 Additionally, the police could not rely on the
arrest of Fixel to justify their warrantless intrusion since the debris
Justice Harlan has therefore been counted by lower courts as a fifth concurring vote,
making Justice Stewart's plain view doctrine a majority view. See, e.g., United States
v. Drew, 451 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Welsch, 446 F.2d 220 (10th Cir.
1971); Leavett v. Howard, 332 F. Supp. 845 (D.R.I. 1971); Brown v. State, 15 Md. App.
684, 292 A.2d 762 (Ct. Sp. App. 1972). But see United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th
Cir. 1971); People v. George, 49 Ill. 2d 372, 274 N.E.2d 26 (1971).
19. 403 U.S. at 468.
20. Id. at 469.
21. Id. at 472-73.
22. Id. at 468.
23. "Plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence."
Id. There must be a lawful justification for the initial intrustion and the discovery must
be inadvertent. Id. at 468-69. These considerations would apply only if the debris pile
was a constitutionally protected area under the fourth amendment. See note 36 and

accompanying text infra.
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pile was not within their eyesight when Fixel was arrested. Put
another way, the arrest justified a warrantless intrusion into Fixel's
apartment, but that was not the area into which the police intruded
to seize the heroin.
Even if there was a lawful intrusion in Fixel, it would also be
necessary under Coolidge that the finding be inadvertent. 24 Although
the Fixel court did not explicitly say so, it apparently considered the
inadvertency requirement inapplicable since the evidence seized in
Fixel was contraband. The court quoted without further comment
the following language from Justice Stewart's opinion in Coolidge:2 5
"The initial intrusion may, of course, be legitimated not by a
warrant but by one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement,
such as hot pursuit or search incident to lawful arrest. But to extend the scope of such an intrusion to the seizure of objects-not
contrabandnor stolen nor dangerous in themselves-which the police
know in advance they will find in plain view and intend to seize,
would fly in the face of the basic rule that no amount of probable
cause can justify a warrantless seizure."
Although the above passage can be read as exempting dangerous,
stolen or contraband objects from the inadvertency requirement applicable to plain view seizures,26 there is another interpretation which
is more consistent with the primacy of the warrant requirement, a
principle vigorously maintained by Justice Stewart in Coolidge. If a
plain view seizure is legitimate "only where it is immediately apparent
24. At some time within thirty days of the arrest, the police sent an informer into
'Fixel's apartment where he made a purchase of marijuana. On the basis of this evidence
the police, on the day of the arrest, obtained a search warrant that only authorized
a search of the apartment. The affidavit was attacked for staleness at the first trial,
which ended in a mistrial. The affidavit was not used by the prosecution at the subsequent trial; however, the affidavit does indicate that the police did have prior knowledge
of the probability of finding narcotics.
25. 256 So. 2d at 29, quoting from 403 U.S. at 471. (Emphasis added by the Fixel

court.)
26. See 403 U.S. at 507 n.4 (Black, J., dissenting) ("The majority correctly notes ...
that this Court .. .flatly rejected the distinction for purposes of the Fourth Amendment
between 'mere evidence' and contraband, a distinction which the majority appears to
me to reinstate at another point in its opinion, ante, at 471 and 472."); id. at 519 (White,
J., dissenting) ("Apparently, contraband, stolen, or dangerous materials may be seized
when discovered in the course of an otherwise authorized search even if the discovery
is fully anticipated and a warrant could have been obtained. The distinction the Court
draws between contraband and mere evidence of crime is reminiscent of the confusing
and unworkable approach that I thought Warden v. Hayden, supra, had firmly put
aside."); State v. Richards, 489 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1971) (concurring opinion) (stating
that in Coolidge the Supreme Court had at last seen the error of its ways in turning
criminals free); Kuipers, Suspicious Objects, Probable Cause and the Law of Search
and Seizure, 21 DRAKE L. REv. 252, 263 (1972).
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to the police that they have evidence before them,''27 then plain view
seizure cannot be extended to objects that are not contraband, stolen
or dangerous because those objects are generally innocuous on their
face. 28 The automobile in Coolidge would have had no significance
to an officer who inadvertently discovered it in another location. Prior
knowledge of the relationship of the automobile to the suspected
murder and of the location of the automobile in Coolidge's driveway
was necessary to give it significance. At the same time, this prior knowledge made inadvertent discovery impossible since the police knew the
location of the evidence and intended to seize it. Only evidence which
on its face bears a relationship to criminal activity regardless of location
is subject to plain view seizure, since only that evidence can be in29
advertently discovered.
Justice Stewart's comment in Coolidge about contraband and dangerous and stolen objects is very similar to a statement made in Warden
v. Hayden.30 That decision abolished the prior doctrine that only
the fruits and instrumentalities of crime were seizable and that "mere
evidence" was not. But to make it clear that the police could not
randomly seize every item that might at some future time and in
some unknown way become relevant to a criminal prosecution, the
Court added that "[t]here must, of course, be a nexus-automatically
provided in the case of fruits, instrumentalities or contraband-between the item to be seized and criminal behavior."' The Coolidge
statement appears to be a reiteration of the observation that the nexus
with criminal activity is automatically provided in the case of conthus making inadvertent distraband, stolen or dangerous objects,
2
covery not certain but possible.3
27. 403 U.S. at 466.
28. There will be a few limited situations in which the police have a detailed description of a criminal object that is not contraband, stolen or dangerous but in which
discovery of the object could be inadvertent if the police did not know or suspect its
location.
29. Although only contraband, stolen or dangerous objects can be discovered inadvertently, this does not mean that there is a presumption that a plain view seizure of
those classes of objects is actually inadvertent. That remains to be proved by the
introduction of other evidence.
30. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
31. Id. at 307.
32. Justice Stewart recognized in Coolidge that there are some exigent circumstances
in which the exigency itself can provide proof of inadvertency even though the police
expect to find evidence and the evidence is not fruits, instrumentalities or contraband.
*This was the case in the seizure of clothing worn by a robber in Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967). This is the one aspect in which Justice Stewart felt that the requirement
in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), that police obtain a warrant whenever
they expect to find evidence is too broad. He specifically mentions the Chimel search
incident to an arrest and the automobile on the open highway as instances where, al-

Florida State University Law Review

(Vol. I

Even if the seizure in Fixel did not comply with federal standards
for a search incident to an arrest or a plain view seizure, it is still
possible that there was no "search" or "seizure" on the theory that
the backyard was not a constitutionally protected area. The court
suggested this theory when it stated that "[i]t is important to note
that we are not dealing with an unlawful entry into a dwelling in
order to procure evidence of a crime but with an alleged trespass
on to land in order to recover contraband."3 The court was apparently
referring to the consideration that the police do not need a warrant
to seize evidence in an open field. 4 For many years the determination
of which areas are constitutionally protected centered around whether
the area was part of the curtilage.3 - Katz shifted emphasis from
the curtilage concept to the idea that the fourth amendment protects people from unreasonable invasion into areas which they
justifiably expect to be private. Justifiable expectations of privacy, and
hence fourth amendment protection, can extend to areas which are
ordinarily open to public use.3 6 In Katz, a public telephone booth
was held to be a place where a person could reasonably expect not to
be overheard once the door was closed. In other cases, courts have
allowed the police to use a public area in a way in which an individual
would expect it to be used. It was permissible for a policeman to
walk down a side alley used by other tenants and see lottery tickets
through an open door because it was reasonable to expect the public
to use the entryway and look in through the door.3 7 On the other
hand, it was held impermissible to use a fire escape to look in a

though the police may expect to find evidence and have the opportunity to obtain a warrant, they are not required to do so. 403 U.S. at 482.
33. 256 So. 2d at 29.
34. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (liquor seized in an open field);
United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (buildings, fields and
automobiles not as protected as a residence); cf. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559
(1927) (boat seized on public waters).
35. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932); Walker v. United States, 225
F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1955); Roberson v. United States, 165 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1948).
36. See Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853, 858 (9th Cir. 1968):
If the determination of such questions is made to turn upon the degree of
privacy a resident is seeking to preserve as shown by the facts of the particular
case, rather than upon a resort to the ancient concept of curtilage, attention will
be more effectively focused on the basic interest which the Fourth Amendment
was designed to protect.
The court cited Katz in finding a search and seizure of a stockpile of Christmas
trees about thirty feet from a motel and five feet from a parking area to be unconstitutional.
37. Harris v. State, 203 Md. 165, 99 A.2d 725 (1953).
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window when an individual could reasonably expect it to be used
only under emergency conditions.'8
The seizure of Fixel's black zipper bag from a pile of debris can
be usefully compared to cases dealing with search and seizure of
trash from trash receptacles. In a recent California case39 the defendant's trash receptacles were placed near the street where they
were picked up and dumped into a garbage truck. The police immediately inspected the trash, which required the dumping of
paper bags, and found marijuana debris. The California Supreme
Court found the seizure to be unconstitutional because the defendant's
"reasonable expectation of privacy . . . [had] . . . been violated by
40
The United States Supreme
unreasonable governmental intrusion."
41
Court has granted certiorari.
Since the Fixel court referred to the issue of constitutionally
protected areas in only one sentence, without supporting citations or
rationale, the court arguably could have proceeded on the basic assumption that the yard or the rubbish pile where the heroin was
hidden was a constitutionally protected area. If the court did intend
to raise the issue, the critical question would then be whether Fixel's
expectation of privacy in the rubbish pile was reasonable, which would
depend on a careful examination of the facts.
The Fixel court dismissed the application of Coolidge to the case
by quoting a short, obscure passage without further comment or
analysis. Whatever one's views are on the wisdom of recent developments in search and seizure law, it is undeniable that matters of
considerable complexity must now be confronted in deciding particular
issues in this area. Although the decision in Fixel may have been
sustainable under existing precedent, the decision itself is unilluminating as an application or interpretation of constitutional principles.
38. Cohen v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 3d 429, 85 Cal. Rptr. 354 (2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1970).
39. People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 486 P.2d 1262 (1971).
40. Id. at 365, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 67, 486 P.2d at 1267. But cf. United States v. Long,
449 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1971) (search warrant for the premises was held to cover a trash
barrel just outside the house).
41. California v. Krivda, 92 S.Ct. 1307 (1972).

